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Introduction
Recent advances in behavioral economics have demonstrated that individual decision-making su¤ers from bounded rationality and various biases. 1 These biases can be especially problematic in complex decisions that involve uncertainty and dynamism. In these situations, the government might want to intervene, indeed individuals might want the government to intervene, to induce behavior that is closer to what individual wish they were doing. The analysis of such corrective interventions, e.g. through taxes and subsidies, can be called 'behavioral public economics'. In these cases, where the government has an objective function that is di¤erent from that of individuals, the government is said to be 'non-welfarist'or paternalistic in its objectives. 2 One important area where the government could improve upon individual choice is related to goods such as education, health and insurance, which in many countries are indeed often publicly regulated, provided or subsidised. In a recent book, Le Grand (2003) discusses whether the clients of government services should be treated as pawns (that is, recipients whose decisions are mainly delegated to the provider) or queens (sovereign consumers). There are a number of reasons why individuals are particularly prone to make mistakes in decisions in these areas. First, the quantity of information may simply be too great or the causal connections too di¢ cult to understand, relative to the mental capacity of a majority of individuals. Second, mental moods can a¤ect the decisions. Third, especially in the case of education, society might want to make some of the education decisions on behalf of the parents to protect the children's rights. Finally, returns to investments and health often accrue only in the distant future. If individuals have a tendency to undervalue future bene…ts (e.g. because of hyperbolic discounting, Laibson (1997)), they might be better o¤ if they delegated some of the decision making to an outsider, e.g. the government, to protect themselves against their own weakness of will. Treating the customers of public services as pawns instead of queens in certain situations can therefore be desirable.
Our aim is to take these points seriously and consider the optimal public provision of private goods, and the optimal level of subsidies for such goods, when individuals'demand for these goods su¤ers from the sort of mistakes behavioral economics has highlighted. We examine what will happen to optimal policy if the government tries to correct these mistakes by basing its own decision on what it thinks is truly best for the individuals. In other words, the government's objective function is paternalistic or non-welfarist.
The paper builds on what has become a now standard framework in the literature, that is, the analysis of public provision as a part of the government's redistributive system. In the modern information-based approach to tax analysis, initiated by Mirrlees (1971) , there is, by now, a large literature examining the role of publicly provided goods (e.g. Boadway and Keen 1993, Edwards, Keen and Tuomala 1994, Boadway and Marchand 1995, Cremer and Gahvari 1997, and Pirttilä and Tuomala 2002). Because of asymmetric information between the taxpayers and the government, the government must take individuals'incentives into account in its optimal tax policy (technically speaking, through incentive-compatibility constraints). Public provision can then be a useful tool for redistribution if it helps to relax the harmful incentive e¤ects of income taxation.
The present paper di¤ers from the existing literature by assuming that the government's objective function is non-welfaristic. We therefore account for two potential market mistakes: asymmetric information (as in earlier models) and mistakes in individual decision-making. It is interesting to examine whether these two departures from the …rst best provide a rationale for public provision in similar situations.
Instead of assuming that all individuals make similar mistakes, it is much more realistic to allow, following O'Donoghue and Rabin (2003), for di¤er-ences in rationality. 3 We therefore examine the case where individuals di¤er in two respects, rationality and income-earning abilities (which is clearly needed for the redistribution motive to make sense). Deriving clear-cut results in optimal tax analysis when individuals di¤er in more than one respect can become notoriously complicated (see, for example the discussion in Boadway, Marchand, Pestieau and Racionero 2002). 4 We therefore follow Christiansen (2003, 2004 ) and concentrate on a three-type interpretation of the Mirrlees (1971) model. Building on Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982) , households can be divided into skilled and less-skilled groups.
In addition, one of the groups can be either fully rational or partly irrational. Proceeding with the three-type case allows for a much easier intuitive discussion, and yet it fully captures the key mechanisms at work. Our paper is most closely related to Kanbur, Pirttilä and Tuomala (2004) , who examine general non-welfarist optimal tax rules in a continuum case. 5 We simplify the analysis by concentrating on a discrete form of the optimal tax model, and extend the work by considering public provision and di¤er-ences in rationality. Our study is also related to earlier work, beginning from Musgrave (1959) , on merit goods. The optimal tax treatment of merit goods, but not their optimal public provision, is analysed by Sandmo (1983) , Besley (1988) , Racionero (2001) , and Schroyen (2005). 6 The paper proceeds as follows. To highlight the main intuition, Section 2 presents a benchmark model where all individuals are assumed to be similarly irrational. Section 3 and 4 consider the three-type version in a pooling and separating equilibrium, respectively. Section 5 covers another policy tool, namely using subsidies instead of public provision to a¤ect commodity demand. Section 6 concludes.
The basic model: All irrational
Consider a Stiglitz (1982) -type model with public provision of private goods along the lines of Boadway and Marchand (1995) . There are two types of households, 1 and 2. The wage rates of the households are w 1 < w 2 . The households supply labour l; and their gross income is y = wl. The households' skill levels are private information, and the government must design a tax schedule based on observable income instead. The after-tax income of a household is given by x = y T (y), where T (y) is a non-linear tax schedule set by the government. The household can spend its after-tax income on two goods, a normal consumption good, c, and on another good, e, which is also provided by the government. The extent of government provision is denoted by g; the overall amount available to the household is e + g z. In other words, the households can top up the publicly provided good through their own purchases, e. The partially indirect utility functions of the households, for given pre and post tax income and public provision, are denoted by v(x; y; g).
Examples of the publicly provided good can include investment in education, old-age pension, health or insurance. The key point is that households can rationally and without biases select the consumption of purely private goods, x:
7 However, they have di¢ culties in designing the correct level of investment on the publicly provided goods. This may be due to the complexity of the decision. A particularly interesting case is one where the costs of publicly provided goods are imminent, but the bene…ts delayed. If households use hyperbolic discounting, they tend to purchase too little of the publicly provided good from the point of view of their period 0 selves and social welfare. Consider, for example, the case where utility (without public provision) is given by u(c; e; y) = u 1 (c; y)+ u 2 (e; y);where is a discount factor. With < 1; the households tend to undervalue the bene…ts of e: Instead of concentrating on a speci…c example, we follow Seade (1980) and Kanbur et al. (2004) and work with a general paternalistic social wel-fare function P (x; y; g), which can, in principle, di¤er in any direction from individual utility v(x; y; g). Let us denote the marginal rate of substitution between g and x as M RS
: For ease of interpretation, we concentrate right from the beginning on the case where
for both i, so that from the social welfare point of view, individuals undervalue g: This is also the way Schroyen (2005) …nds useful in thinking about merit goods. In the example above, the social welfare function would be one without hyperbolic discounting ( = 1); i.e. P (c; e; y) = u 1 (c; y) + u 2 (e; y):
Denote the individual marginal rate of substitution between consumption and income by s = vy vx and the social marginal rate of substitution by s P = Py Px : There is no need for the two to be equal. If P g > v g ; and if the labour supply and publicly provided private good were complements, s P > s, and the government would like the individual to supply more labour than he or she would typically decide himself. One interpretation of this case is that education, health and the like improve the income-earning ability and desire of households. On the other hand, one can imagine that irrationality is related to workaholism, i.e. to a tendency to overwork. Then s P < s.
8
The social planner is assumed to have a utilitarian social welfare function over P 1 and P 2 . The constraints are a resource constraint that the tax revenue must equal the costs of public provision for two individuals, 2rg (where r is the marginal rate of transformation between c and g); and a self-selection constraint that the high-ability type must not mimic the choice of the low-ability type. Note that while the social welfare depends on P; the self-selection constraint is similar to the standard model and depends on the utility function generating private behaviour, v:
The lagrangean of the optimisation problem is given by
8 Hamermesh and Slemrod (2004) provide a detailed analysis of workaholism.
6 and the …rst-order conditions by
where b v refers to the mimicker (a type 2 representative mimicking the choice of type 1).
Marginal tax rates
The individuals choose the labour supply by maximising v(x; y; g) subject to the budget constraint x = y T (y): From this, the marginal tax rate can be expressed as M T R = T 0 = vy vx + 1: The marginal tax rates for both household types can therefore be derived by dividing (3) by (2) and (5) by (4), respectively, and they are given by
and
These results give rise to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the publicly provided good is a complement (substitute) to the labour supply, the marginal tax rate for the high-skilled households is negative (positive) and the marginal tax rate for the low-skilled household has an ambiguous (positive) sign.
If the publicly provided good is a complement to labour supply, i.e. s P 1 > s 1 ; the marginal tax rate for the high-skilled individual is negative, as the government wants to boost the labour supply and indirectly induce the individual to consume more of e: A similar e¤ect is present in the rule for the marginal tax rate for the low-skilled (the …rst term at the right of (7)), but the rule also depends on a comparison between the marginal rate of substitution of a mimicker and a true type 1 household. This comparison can be signed on the basis of the single-crossing condition. Therefore, b s > s 1 and the last term in (7)) is positive. The overall sign of the marginal tax rate for the low-skilled household remains ambiguous if the publicly provided good is a complement to the labour supply. In the opposite case, the marginal tax rate for type 1 household is positive.
The gist of these results is that a potential connection between the publicly provided good and the labour supply a¤ects the income tax rules as well. Unlike in a standard model (such as Boadway and Marchand 1995), the income tax rules depend here on the decision on public provision. This result is also derived, albeit in a di¤erent setting, by Blomquist and Christiansen (2005), where public provision (daycare) is directly proportional to labour supply.
Optimal public provision rule
Consider next the welfare impacts of public provision. The derivative of (1) with respect to g can be written as follows:
Substitution from (2) and (4), and adding and subtracting M RS
where the mimicker's marginal rate of substitution is denoted by d M RS g;x . When none of the true ability persons is crowded out, i.e. the publicly provided amount does not exceed the amount inviduals wish to buy themselves 9 , individuals' maximisation implies that the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the marginal rate of transformation. For two individuals, this means that P M RS i = 2r: Therefore, the sign of
at the second-best optimum is determined by the rest of the terms. The terms
g;x measure the deviations between the social planner's and the individual's marginal rate of substitution. In the case which we focus on, P g is larger than v g ; and therefore
The sign of the last term at the right of (9) depends on the relative valuation of g between a mimicker and social planner for type 1. In a standard welfarist case (e.g. in Boadway and Marchand 1995), the comparison is between M RS 1 g;x and d M RS g;x . There, if public provision and the labour supply are complements, the labour supply of a mimicker is smaller than that of true low-skilled person, and M RS
However, in our case the sign truly depends on the comparison between
g;x and d M RS g;x If public provision and the labour supply are complements, the social planner wants the true type 1 individual to consume even more of z than he or she otherwise would. Therefore,
In the case where public provision is a substitute for labour supply,
The following proposition summarises:
Proposition 2 When individuals undervalue z from the viewpoint of social welfare, public provision of z is welfare improving if the labour supply and the publicly provided goods are complements. If the labour supply and the publicly provided goods are substitutes, public provision may or may not be welfare improving.
To gain intuition for the result, remember that we consider two departures from the …rst-best world: asymmetry of information and irrationality. To correct for the latter, a paternalistic social planner imposes a positive amount of public provision. To deal with the former distortion, earlier literature, cited in the introduction, has shown that public provision can be used to alleviate the harmful incentive e¤ects arising from distortionary income taxation, if public provision and the labour supply are complements. Stylised facts suggest that this is also a plausible case: daycare and care of the elderly are clearly more important for workers than non-workers, and public education becomes useful when employed.
These two channels interact in the following way. If the labour supply and the publicly provided good are complements, an increase in public provision both decreases the scope of the mistake individuals make when allocating funds between public and private consumption and also reduces the harmful incentive e¤ects from mimicking. On the other hand, if public provision is a substitute for labour supply, the two e¤ects contradict each other and the net impact remains ambiguous.
In policy terms, there can exist important examples of public provision that are useful tools to deal with both asymmetry of information and irrationality. Policies that increase income-earning abilities and labour force participation, but which individuals tend to undervalue, could include investments in education and health care.
Finally, when the labour supply and the publicly provided good are unrelated (preferences are separable between consumption and leisure), public provision can no longer be used as a tool to reduce incentives to mimicking.
The terms related to paternalism nevertheless remain in the provision rule even under separable preferences. 10 
Di¤erences in rationality
There is, of course, no need to require that all individuals are equally irrational. As in O'Donoghue and Rabin (2003), it is more useful to assume that irrational individuals form only a part of the population. Given that innate rationality is something the social planner cannot directly observe, the question is how public policy should be formulated to account for both the perfectly and the less-than-perfectly rational households.
Combining this extension with the earlier assumption that households di¤er in their income-earning ability leaves us with four di¤erent types of households. Because of the complications of the problem, here we follow Christiansen (2003, 2004 ) and concentrate on a somewhat simpler three type model. Type 1 individuals with low wage rates are all assumed to be irrational in their choices over publicly provided goods. Part of the high-income earners are assumed to be irrational (type 2) and part fully rational (type 3). For the latter class, P = v:
11
The formulation of self-selection constraints becomes more complicated. It depends, …rst, on how the distributional preferences of the government hinge on the rationality of households. Second, the ordering of the two high-ability households now depends on how the labour supply is related to the degree of rationality. Therefore, a large number of di¤erent cases can emerge. In order not lose tractability, we concentrate on the case which 10 This can be seen more clearly when the provision rule is written as
are separable between consumption and leisure, the term d M RS M RS seems most plausible: the social planner wants to redistribute from the rich to the poor, as in a standard income tax model, and the labour supply and the publicly provided good, z, are complements. Then type 3 households, while consuming more of z; supply more labour than type 2 households. Let us also assume that type 1 households will never want to mimic the choice of high income earners. This means that we must consider two potential self-selection constraints: households 3 should not be allowed to mimic type 2 households, and type 2 households should not be allowed to mimic type 1 households. 12 Two possible equilibria may emerge: a separating equilbrium, where the social planner picks a separate bundle for all households, or a pooling equilbrium, where the planner cannot distinguish between the two lower income types, and there is a common bundle for type 1 and type 2 households. Let us …rst concentrate on the pooling equilibrium. The separating equilibirum is dealt with in the next section.
In a pooling equilibrium, type 1 and type 2 households receive the same gross and net income. Thus, there is only one binding self-selection constraint: type 3 households should not mimic the common choice of types 1 and 2. The Lagrangean is now given by
Remembering that x 1 = x 2 and y 1 = y 2 the …rst-order conditions with respect to x h and y h ; h = 1; 3 are
(1 + ) v 3 y + = 0 (12)
Marginal tax rates in the pooling case
It is straightforward to see from the …rst-order conditions (11) and (12) that the marginal tax rate of type 3 is zero. Marginal tax rates for the other types can be derived by adding and subtracting terms v (13) and (14), respectively, and dividing (14) by (13) . The marginal tax rates of types 1 and 2 can be written as
There are two channels present in the income tax rate of the irrational types: the …rst term arises from the self-selection constraint and the last two terms from irrationality. The …rst term is positive, as b v 3 x > 0 and mimicker's marginal rate of substitution is greater than a representative of true type 1 as a result of the single-crossing property. The last two terms depend on the di¤erence between the true type's and the social planner's marginal rates of substitution. When the publicly provided good and the labour supply are complements, s P > s. It is also natural to assume that even in a three-type case, both P 1 x and P 2 x are positive. The rule for marginal tax rates in the pooling optimum can thus be stated in the following way Proposition 3 The marginal tax rate of the rational high productivity type is zero. The sign of the marginal tax rate of the other two types is ambiguous if the publicly provided good is a complement with the labour supply(s P > s), and positive if the publicly provided good is a substitute with the labour supply(s P < s).
Note …nally that in a special case where
x ; i.e. the government's valuation depends only on income level, not rationality, the rule is the same as in the two-type case. 13 
Public provision in pooling equilibrium
To …nd the optimal rule for public provision, we derive the derivative of Lagrangian (10) with respect to g.
After the same kind of manipulation as in the previous section, this can be written as
The …rst row again coincides with the individual optimisation when none of the true types is crowded out. In the second row there are two terms arising from irrationality. As the social planner values the consumption of the publicly provided good more than types 1 and 2, these terms are positive.
The terms in the last row arise from mimicking. Consider …rst the multipliers To deduce the sign of the terms, we concentrate on a case where g is complement to labour supply. In the …rst of the terms in the last row of (17) g;x ; the sign would not be clear. The true type 1 representative works more, and, since g and the labour supply are complements, tends to favour g more. On the other hand, the type 3 individual is rational and therefore also favours g: Thus, M RS The following proposition summarises this discussion.
Proposition 4 Even when consumption of good g is too low from the social welfare point of view and g is complement to the labour supply, public provision of g is not unambiguously welfare improving in a pooling equilibrium.
When the publicly provided private good and the labour supply are complements, both the aim to reduce the harm from irrationality and asymmetric information separatively would speak for a positive level of public provision. However, when these two aims are put together, it is no longer clear that public provision improves welfare both as a tool to correct irrationality and asymmetric information. Taking into account di¤erences in rationality, the two problems, irrationality and asymmetry of information, interact in a way that precludes stating simple policy rules without further assumptions. Note that a result that has a similar character is derived by Jordahl and Micheletto (2005) . They consider a model with taste di¤erences and di¤erences in income-earning abilities and show that, in a three-type model, the commodity tax can have an ambiguous sign even if the sign was unambiguous without taste di¤erences.
Finally, it can be noticed that when preferences are separable between the labour supply and the publicly provided private good, in pooling equilibrium we have M RS
In that case rule (17) reduces to dL dg
This implies that the social and private optima coincide only when the last two terms are zero. These positive terms would vanish only when the agents are rational, i.e. P M RS = M RS. Thus, irrationality induces a higher level of provision than private optimum would suggest even with separable preferences.
Three-type model and a separating equilibrium
The other possible case is a separating equilibrium where each household is given a separate bundle of x and y. Now there are two binding self-selection constraints: type 3 households should prefer his bundle to type 2 household's choice and type 2 households should not want to mimic the choice of type 1 households. The resulting Lagrange function is
16 and the …rst-order conditions are given by
Marginal tax rates
By standard procedures, the following marginal tax rates can be derived from …rst-order conditions
On the basis of equations (25), (26) and (27) , one can write the following proposition:
Proposition 5 If the publicly provided good is a complement to the labour supply (i.e. s < s P ), then the marginal tax rate for the type 3 households is zero, and the marginal tax rates for the type 1 and type 2 households have ambiguous signs.
Note …rst that since we assume type 3 households are rational, there is no need to distort their choice. The marginal tax rates for the type 1 and 2 households consist of two terms, a corrective term and a standard selfselection term. As in the two type model, these have opposite signs, and the overall signs of the marginal tax rates for 1 and 2 remain ambiguous.
Public good provision in the separating case
Consider next the welfare impacts of public provision. The derivative of (18) with respect to g can be written as follows:
Following a similar procedure as in earlier sections, equation (28) can be written as
The interpretation of (29) Following the reasoning in the previous section, they are, however, equal if the social planner corrects the valuation of type 2 exactly to the level chosen by the rational type 3 mimicker. In this case, the last term vanishes from the rule.
The sign of the coe¢ cient 1 v 2
x is not trivial. Using the …rst-order condition (21) we …nd that 1
x . This is negative when
x . This condition holds when the social planner's valuation of the income of type 2 is su¢ ciently small. Overall, all terms in (29) are positive or zero, except 1 v
According to this discussion, we can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Even when consumption of good g is too low from the social welfare point of view and g is complement to the labour supply, public provision of g is not unambiguously welfare improving in a separating equilibrium.
The irrationality of type 1 household, implied by the term
g;x leads to an unambiguously positive public provision and, thus, the higher the distortion due to irrationality is, the higher the public provision level should be. However, when the term referring to the irrationality of type 2 is negative, it implies that the higher the gap between the socially desirable and the actual level of consumption of type 2 is, the lower the public provision level should be. This can be interpreted so that if government does not value the consumption of type 2 agents enough (i.e. if
x ), their irrationality problem is worsened by public provision. As in the pooling equilibrium, there is again a potential con ‡ict between the two policy goals of the government (correction of asymmetric information and irrationality). Even if there is a straightforward positive linkage between public provision and the labour supply, the use of a single policy instrument is not unambiguously desirable.
The conditions for the optimal provision of the publicly provided good in pooling and separating cases, Equations (17) and (29), look somewhat di¤erent. To …nd the di¤erence between the rules we determine the di¤er-ence between dL dg separating equilibrium and dL dg pooling equilibrium . After some tedious manipulation there are two terms left:
This di¤erence can also be given as
g . It is positive (negative), if the true type 2 agent values g more (less) than the mimicker. Because the mimicker works fewer hours than the true type agent, we can conclude that if g and the labour supply are complements, v 2 g > b v 2 g and thus the provision of good g tends to be greater in the separating equilirium than in the pooling equilibrium. Given that in the pooling equilibrium, type 2 households are problematic (as they cannot be separated from poorer type 1 households), it is natural that the di¤erence in (30) hinges on the properties of type 2. In a separating equilibrium, one worries less about this consideration, and perhaps therefore the public provision can more fully account for the needs of type 2 individuals.
Furthermore, it can also be noticed that when preferences are separable between the publicly provided private good and leisure, v 
g;x ; both in the pooling and the separating optima. Therefore, with separable preferences, the socially optimal rule for the publicly provided private good in the separating equilibrium di¤ers from the privately optimal only to the extent that individuals su¤er from irrationality.
Commodity taxation
Up until now we have concentrated on public provision. As earlier literature has pointed out (starting from Edwards et al., 1994) , price subsidies on similar goods can be used as an alternative mechanism to reach the same goals. Here we brie ‡y consider the optimal commodity tax (subsidy) rule in two cases: the benchmark case of two types and the pooling equilibrium in the three type case. 14 
Commodity taxation in a two type model
To …nd the optimal commodity tax we need to rede…ne our model. Assume now that there is no public provision at all and the agents use all their net income on the consumption of two goods, c and e. 15 We denote the demand by a vector d h = [c; e], where the superscript h refers to an agent. Now there is also a price vector q = p + t, where vector p consists of the producer prices and t = [0; t] is tax levied on good e. Government's and agent's (partially indirect) utility functions are W (q;x; y) and v(q;x; y); respectively. Government's budget constraint is now P (y
given the exogenous revenue requirement (which can also be zero). This constraint can be rewritten on the basis of consumer's budget constraint as
Now there are two alternative ways to de…ne how the government's and the individuals preferences di¤er. First, following Besley (1988) ; varies with the price, q e . If the good is a merit good, the marginal rate of substitution is higher for the government than for the individual, i.e. M RS W;h qe;x > M RS h qe;x : In this case, an increase in the price of e requires a larger compensation in terms of other consumption for the government than for the individual. 16 The Lagrangean of the optimisation problem is given by 15 The conditions for the case when public provision should be favoured over price subsidies is a complex matter. This question is analysed in a welfarist case by Blomquist and Christiansen (1998) . 16 The latter formulation is similar to one in Blomquist and Micheletto (2005) .
and the …rst-order conditions with respect to x 1 , x 2 and q e are now
We derive the commodity tax rule for both the de…nitions of merit good, de…ned above. 
where S is the Slutsky substitution e¤ect P @he @q and
The interpretation of this form is similar to the one in which Roy's identity is assumed to hold also for social planner; the marginal rates of substitution is substituted for demands. Thus in the following analysis we concentrate only on the previous form.
The rule for the optimal commodity tax rate in Eq.(35) indicates that 17 For details see the Appendix.
the sign of the optimal commodity tax depends, …rst, on the di¤erences in demands between true type 1 agents and mimickers and, second, on the difference between the socially desired and the actual demand. If mimickers consume the good in question less than mimicked agents (e 1 > b e 2 ) and consumption is on too low a level from the social point of view (e W;h > e h ), a subsidy improves welfare in two ways: it both corrects the rationality problem and makes mimicking less attractive. In the opposite case, where a mimicker consumes more and all irrational households have too high a demand from the social point of view, a commodity tax would improve welfare. However, if terms have opposite signs, i.e. the mimicker is a larger consumer of the good than a true type agent and it would socially bene…cial to consume more than is actually done, then the sign of the optimal commodity tax rates remains ambiguous. The rationality problem can be corrected by a negative commodity tax, but at the same time mimicking becomes more appealing. Thus, there is a trade-o¤ between redistribution and rationality objectives. The optimality of commodity taxes can be summarised in the following way.
Proposition 7
The commodity tax should be negative (positive) if the true type agent consumes more (less) than the mimicker and the desired level of consumption is larger (smaller) than the actual level chosen. Such subsidy (tax) would improve welfare by correcting the consumption distorted by irrationality and by mitigating the self-selection constraint.
Commodity taxation in a pooling equilibrium
As in the previous section, here, too, we consider replacing public provision of good g by commodity taxation. Using the same notation as earlier, the Lagrangian can be given as
The …rst-order conditions with respect to x h , h = 1; 3 and q e are needed:
After some manipulations presented in the Appendix, the optimal commodity tax rate can be given 18 as
Compared with the two-type economy, the two …rst terms are alike. The conclusions for the signs of these are similar to the previous section. The last term is analogous to the "redistribution term" received in Blomquist and Christiansen (2004) . Since in a pooling equilibrium the government cannot distinguish between type 1 and type 2 individuals, but would like to favour type 1 individuals as they earn less, the government can use the commodity tax as an indirect instrument to a¤ect the welfare levels between the two agents. The derivative @L @x 2 illustrates the welfare e¤ect of an increase of type 2 agent's net income and it can be assumed to be negative when redistribution is done from high productivity types towards low ability types. With negative S we arrive at the following conclusion.
Proposition 8
In the pooling equilibrium a subsidy is welfare-improving if (i) the true type 1 agent consumes more than the mimicker, (ii) consumption is at too low a level from the social point of view and (iii) low skilled type consumes more than high skilled type with the same income.
Consider the case where the labour supply and the subsidised good are complements. Then e 1 > e 2 ; as type 1 has lower productivity. However, e 1 can be smaller or larger than b e 3 : The type 1 representative works more and his valuation is therefore high, but the mimicker is rational, and his valuation is also high. In sum, in contrast to the two-type case, when part of the households are rational, it is no longer clear that a subsidy is desirable both from irrationality and asymmetric information reasons, even if the subsidised good is a complement to the labour supply. This result is similar to what was derived in the case of public provision in Section 3.
Conclusions
Much of modern governments'activities are not related to night-watchman duties or the provision of pure public goods. A major share of public expenditure is directed to the funding of publicly provided private goods, such as education, health care, care of the elderly, and pension policies. Using a modern, information-based, optimal tax framework, this paper considered two motives for the public provision of private goods: redistribution and paternalism. The latter concern is warranted by recent discussion on behavioural economics indicating that individuals may have a tendency towards biased decisions related to these goods. Informational asymmetry between the government and the taxpayers implies that incentive e¤ects must be taken into account in redistributive tax policy and the design of public services. Irrational behaviour by individuals provides a potential scope for a paternalistic policy where the government, through its tax and public provision policy, induces behaviour that is closer to what it believes is truly best for the individuals. Our results show that public provision can indeed be used as a mechanism to address these concerns. This is the case, in a model where all households su¤er from similar bounded rationality, if the social planner wants to induce individuals consume more publicly provided goods than they themselves would buy and if the publicly provided private good is a complement to the labour supply. Then the paternalistic considerations and a desire to alleviate distortions from income taxation by public provision are aligned.
However, in a richer model where some of the households are fully rational, redistributive and paternalistic objectives can clash even if public provision boosts the labour supply. This result implies that a simple policy tool, public provision, is insu¢ cient to reach both goals in the more general case. The intuition for this somewhat unexpected result stems from the idea that the government may want to value the utility of irrational households less than that of fully-rational households. On the other hand, if redistribution is directed from rich to poor and the fully-rational households work more, the government would like to favour the poorer irrational households. In this case, the two policy objectives point to di¤erent directions.
In contrast with standard models of public provision, the decision of public good provision also a¤ects the rules governing the marginal tax rates. This is the case if the labour supply and the demand for publicly provided private good are related. Then the optimal marginal tax rate rules include novel corrective terms.
Subject to the quali…cations presented above, it is not entirely implausible that a case exists for public provision of certain goods for paternalistic reasons. Needless to say, the gain from such a policy must be weighed against the potential mistakes the social planner can make when designing paternalistic policies. It is also important to bear in mind the ethical dimensions involved. A paternalistic policy that e.g. protects the individuals is welcomed by some, while others cannot accept such restrictions on individual freedom. 
We denote P @he @q as S. In the case where only one of the goods is taxed matrix S reduces to scalar number, and thus we can divide the equation by it. In a more general case, where S is a larger matrix, we can multiply the equation by the inverse of S. If one can write W qe = W x e P ; a sort of Roy's identity for the social planner, we can rewrite the commodity tax rule as (35). However, if one wants to avoid the problem with the Roy's identity, denote Marshallian demands by marginal rates of substitution M RS 
Three types and pooling equilibrium
Manipulation is here equivalent to the one in the two type case. From (40) we get
